The Betrayed Liberation: Remembering the Bay of Pigs

Myles B. Kantor
Thursday, April 17, 2003

April 17 marks the 42nd anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, where approximately 1,500 Cuban exiles attempted to overthrow Fidel Castro’s totalitarian regime. To discuss this event is Victor Triay, a history professor at Middlesex Community College in Connecticut and author of “Bay of Pigs: An Oral History of Brigade 2506.”

When, by whom, and why was the operation that became the Bay of Pigs conceived?

The source of the invasion had numerous starting points. There were a large number of Cubans conspiring against Castro from very early on, with new groups joining the cause daily.

These groups ranged from university student groups to organizations put together by the former democratic political parties. One group of young, former officers were already planning an invasion and training in the Everglades.

In early 1960, President Eisenhower instructed CIA Director Dulles to start putting together a contingency plan for Castro's overthrow. This included a propaganda war, bringing together the different exile groups into a single organization, the creation of an intelligence network in Cuba, and the training of a guerrilla force.

In March, after the U.S. tried to reach out to Castro and was rejected – this is a month after Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet Deputy Premier, visited Cuba – Ike approved the plan the special CIA task force had created.

In time, former officers with no Batista connections, politicians, and other Cuban activists in exile were organized. Those who would have a combat role were taken to Useppa Island off Florida's west coast. Eventually, they went to Nicaragua and Panama to train as guerrillas. Later, in the fall of 1960, the plan was changed to a conventional, frontal assault and more troops recruited from among the exiles.

During his 1960 presidential campaign, John Kennedy criticized Vice President Richard Nixon and President Dwight Eisenhower for a weak policy toward Cuba under Castro.

"I wasn't the vice president who presided over the communization of Cuba," he said during a speech in Jacksonville, Fla. He said in Cincinnati on Oct. 6, "He [Castro] has transformed the island of Cuba into a hostile and militant Communist satellite – a base from which to carry Communist infiltration and subversion throughout the Americas."

His campaign released the following statement on Oct. 19: "We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our government."

Yet Kennedy wasn't similarly robust when it came to implementing the Bay of Pigs.

This was JFK's biggest problem. Seen as weak on Communism, he had to talk tough during the campaign and chose the Cuba issue as the vehicle to demonstrate his toughness. He made many bold statements, having no idea the extent of planning the administration (including Nixon) had been involved in concerning Cuba.

When he became president, he became aware of how much the CIA under Ike had actually done. Now, because of his own rhetoric, he had to go forward with the operation even though he was reluctant to do so. So, instead of canceling it, he emasculated it piece by piece, to the point that it ensured failure.

Why was Kennedy reluctant to follow through with the operation?

JFK was very worried about world reaction and about the U.S.A. appearing as a bully against a small country. During this time, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. were competing not just militarily, but there was also a great PR game being played – so world opinion was something the higher-ups were concerned with. This was kind of naive, as the case for liberating Cuba was an easy one and one that would have stood the test of time.

He also feared Soviet intervention. The U.S.S.R. had already issued stern warnings to the U.S. after the D-2 attacks and the debacle at the United Nations (which was between the D-2 air attacks and the actual invasion).

Again, the way JFK handled this backfired. JFK emasculated the invasion to be able to plausibly deny the U.S. role, and because of this the invasion failed. Yet, in the end, everyone knew about the U.S. role anyhow. So, he should have known the U.S. was going to take the heat one way or another, and thus should have backed the invasion to the hilt.

To what extent were people other than Kennedy responsible for the failure of the Bay of Pigs?

Well, there was enough blame to go around. Kennedy was certainly advised poorly, but most of that poor advice came from his appointed civilian advisers, such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and not from the CIA and Joint Chiefs.

Let's discuss some stereotypes about the Bay of Pigs:

a) "Participants were a bunch of white supporters of the former dictator, Fulgencio Batista."

There are many stereotypes of the Brigade, including the one that says they were a bunch of white Batistianos. First of all, there were many blacks and mulattoes in the Brigade. Secondly, true Batistianos were banned from the Brigade as per President Eisenhower's directive that all Communists and Batistianos be excluded. A few Batistianos made it through, but only a small handful. Of course, Castro's propaganda machine had a field day with these guys.

b) "Participants were puppets of the U.S. government."

The men certainly were not puppets of the U.S. government. Clearly, they accepted help from the U.S. and even delegated much of the decision making to the U.S., but they were ordinary Cubans fighting for the liberation of their country that had been lost to a Communist conspiracy. They were no more puppets than the French Resistance in World War II.

c) "The Bay of Pigs was doomed to failure due to popular support for Castro."

Wrong. In fact, this view is quite naive. The plan failed because JFK did not follow through on the invasion as planned. A number of things had to go right for the anti-Castro resistance to seize the political momentum. Any “popular” uprisings were only expected to occur only after that happened.

Because of Kennedy's changes to and cancellations of the air plan (some coming after the Brigade was already on the beaches) the anti-Castro forces in Cuba were unable to do anything. How many were there in Cuba? Well, Castro felt the need to detain between 100,000 and 500,000 people during the invasion. I say this because Peter Wyden, author of “Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story”, once commented that all the anti-Castro Cubans were in Miami. I'd like to know who it was, then, that Castro detained.

d) “The Bay of Pigs proved Castro was right when he claimed America had imperialist designs on Cuba.”

The U.S. at this time was supposed to be at war with Communism. In Latin America, this proved difficult. There had been occasions in the pre-Cold War era that, it could be argued, the U.S. acted as an “imperial” power. Whether this was true or false, justified or unjustified, it did create among many Latin Americans a hypersensitivity to “U.S./Yankee (Yanqui) Imperialism.”

Thus, when the U.S. went in genuinely to help a group of people fight repression, it was easy for its enemies to brand its actions as imperialistic.

The U.S. did have its own reasons for wanting Castro gone. A Soviet base 90 miles from the U.S. was a true threat to U.S. national security. It would have been a nuclear launching pad permanently anchored offshore. For the U.S. not to try and get rid of Castro would have been terribly irresponsible leadership.

As we know, the scenario of Soviet missiles in Cuba became a reality in 1962. This country was truly on the verge of nuclear war in 1962, but it would not have been if JFK had done what he needed to do in 1961.

So, as I see it, the U.S. was perfectly justified in its actions. First, because its goal was to institute a democratic government in Cuba (the provisional government was made up of historic democratic Cubans), and was within its rights from a national security point of view.

Castro's forces killed 114 Brigade members and captured 1,189. How were these prisoners treated?

The prisoners were very poorly treated. Most of them spent their captivity in a horrid old Spanish prison in Havana, where they suffered malnutritition, disease and a lack of medical attention (not to mention the historical psychological cruelty of Castro's prisons). Those sent to the Isle of Pines (around 200 of them) had it much worse.

What are the lessons of the Bay of Pigs?

The most important lesson, of the 1960s overall, was that it proved that when you commit yourself militarily, you cannot do so halfway. JFK sent an invasion that had been emasculated for purely political reasons and expected success. We then have the Vietnam War, which was conducted with the same mentality.

When you decide you are going to war, you have to go all out with no holds barred (aside from unnecessary cruelty, especially to civilians), because losing can have catastrophic consequences. Not only does this have an impact on the U.S., but also people tend to forget the fate of the Cuban and Vietnamese people who, after decades, still live under a brutally repressive system.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said on “Meet the Press” on April 13 when asked about the possibility of a U.S. liberation of Cuba in light of Iraq's liberation:

“We hope they have the opportunity to say what they want, and practice freedom of religion and freedom of speech, freedom of assembly. But we recognize in a complicated world that there are countries that live differently. And so it isn't a matter for the United States to try to have everyone else be like us.”

What is your opinion of this position?

I think he was caught off guard by the question, and, like Miami radio host Ninoska Perez Castellon said, his comments were inconsistent with the White House's policy. I think that if he had to answer it again, he would do so differently.

His comment about not making everyone live like us in the U.S., however, almost made it sound like Cubans may not want to live in freedom! Anyhow, I also think Jose Basulto of Brothers to the Rescue has a good point about the moment for military intervention having passed and gone. These things are driven by the politics of the day.

In 1961, the spread of Communism was the greatest threat to the freedom of the U.S.A. Now, despite whatever realities may exist – Cuba’s possession of biological weapons, its connections and assistance to terrorists, its real threat to the U.S., etc. – most political people view Castro as a relatively harmless dinosaur from a different era who will soon be dead.

Cuba is also seen in the context of Latin America. After 9/11, the greatest threat was from terrorism – well, in truth, not terrorism per se, but Islamist terrorism emanating from the Middle East. It would be a tough sell (despite, again, the realities) politically (domestically and internationally) to cast Fidel Castro currently as a greater threat than Syria or Iran – or, for that matter, North Korea, whose leader is more outspoken and brazen about the damage he can do.

Contact Myles Kantor at kantor@FreeEmigration.com.

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