CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: PART II*

ICCAS

From Fidel Castro's perspective, Latin America in 2004 is an "extremely fertile ground for revolutionary changes."(1) The mentor of the radical left expressed his optimism for the region on January 29 in a nearly six-hour-long speech to more than 1200 activists from 32 countries gathered in Havana at the closing session of the "Third Hemispheric Forum Against the FTAA."(2) Castro urged the Western Hemisphere's anti-FTAA political parties, populist movements, labor leaders, and leftist intellectuals to employ a variety of tactics in order to bring about a crisis in their respective homelands, citing Venezuela and Argentina as models of what can be accomplished. "Without a crisis," stressed the Cuban revolutionary, "what happened in Argentina and what is taking place in Venezuela would not be possible." Among other methods, Castro emphasized "using all forms and means of mass media to bring [anti-FTAA] ideas to the masses, to educate and mobilize them," noting "Cuba's willingness to supply radio and audiovisual literacy programs" in support of the anti-FTAA campaign.(3)

In their final declaration and action plan, the Cuba-inspired anti-free trade forces in Havana took credit for ousting Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada from the presidency in Bolivia in 2003. Delegates to the conference also agreed to a coordinated parliamentary strategy to defeat any and all trade liberalization agreements with the United States, including a modified FTAA as well as bilateral accords with Washington. The first battle to be waged will be against the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which is pending ratification by the national legislative bodies of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in 2004.(4)

Despite Cuba's sustained efforts at building an anti-American coalition in Latin America to impede the implementation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Washington does not believe that "any one country constitutes a roadblock on the FTAA." According to Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, "[the U.S.] will just go around them."(5) However, Castro's influence in Latin America could mean that Washington may have to contemplate "going around" more than one country by the end of the year.

ARGENTINA: The election of Nestor Kirchner in 2003 put an end to more than a decade of estranged relations between Buenos Aires and Havana during the Menem and De la Rua administrations. The visit of Argentine foreign minister Rafael Bielsa to Havana in October 2003 served to reestablish full diplomatic ties and initiate negotiations on Cuba's US$1.9 billion unpaid debt to Argentina. While Bielsa communicated President Kirchner's offer to forgive 50 percent of Cuban obligations to his country, the Cuban government requested a 75-percent debt forgiveness package (the same terms demanded by Argentina from its bondholders). Most of the remaining portion would be paid in kind, largely by Cuba exporting its pharmaceutical and biotechnology products to Argentina and providing free medical care in the island to low-income Argentines. An official visit by Kirchner to Havana to finalize an agreement could take place in February 2004. Beyond obtaining substantial debt relief from Argentina in 2004, the Castro regime is also counting on Kirchner's continued opposition to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Moreover, in conjunction with Brazil, Argentina is lobbying to bring Cuba into the four-nation [Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay] MERCOSUR trading bloc. Should the FTAA be implemented in 2005, membership in MERCOSUR would safeguard Cuba from complete economic isolation from the rest of Latin America. Presently, the only obstacle to Cuba's entry into MERCOSUR is Uruguay's president, Jorge Batlle, who broke off diplomatic relations with Havana in 2002.(6)

BOLIVIA: After losing the 2002 presidential election to the U.S.-educated Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, congressman Evo Morales, head of Bolivia's Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party and leader of the country's coca growers' union, initiated a populist campaign to derail the new pro-free trade administration's program for privatizing and exporting Bolivia's natural gas. In 2003 Morales spearheaded a coalition of labor unions and indigenous peoples in demonstrations and violent clashes with the military that brought about the resignation and exile to the U.S. of President Sanchez de Lozada.(7) Morales is a veteran Sao Paulo Forum activist with ties to Cuba since at least the mid-1990s.(8) He traveled to Havana to meet with Fidel Castro after the fall of Sanchez de Lozada and has long expressed his desire for a Cuba-inspired Latin American alliance against the United States.(9) At a rally in Buenos Aires in 1995, Morales called on leftists to follow Cuba's example: "If we want to be free, in Latin America there should not be one Cuba, but several Cubas...What do we need for that? Heroic figures. And for me, Fidel Castro is such a figure. I am ready to proclaim him commander of the liberation forces of America, or Latin America."(10) His rhetoric even echoes the caustic tone and themes of Castro's speeches. Received as a de facto head of state by the Mexican Congress in 2003 after the so-called "civil coup" against Sanchez de Lozada, Morales declared, "Anti-imperialist thinking has grown around the world with Bush's mistaken invasion of Iraq...I dream of boosting this anti-imperialist message with a great summit including Fidel, Lula, and Chavez, to show that we are united, and to make the North American imperialists think twice."(11) Meanwhile, Morales and radical Aymara Indian leader Felipe Quispe have given current president Carlos Mesa, Sanchez de Lozada's vice president and successor, no more than six months to meet their demands.(12) With Morales as the ultimate power broker, Mesa's already precarious administration is threatened with the same fate as that of his predecessor. The prospect of Evo Morales at the helm in La Paz would not only mean the expansion of an anti-American regional bloc in South America, but also vindicate Ernesto "Che" Guevara's defeat and death in Bolivia in 1967 at the hands of U.S.-led counter-insurgency forces. A Bolivia under Morales, who has already vowed to terminate a U.S.-funded coca crop eradication program, could also become a haven for the narcotics operations of Colombia's leftist guerrillas, particularly the FARC. Long-term, with the definitive withdrawal in 2003 of a foreign investment proposal to develop Bolivian natural gas reserves for export to California (13), a major energy source could fall into the hands of Argentina or Brazil, and eventually benefit Cuba. A Cuba-Bolivia cooperation accord modeled after the Havana-Caracas agreement (with Bolivian gas going to Cuba in exchange for Cuban doctors, teachers, etc.) is not beyond the realm of possibility if Evo Morales takes over the presidency.

BRAZIL: The ascension of Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva to the presidency in Brazil was in no small measure due to the guidance and support received from Fidel Castro since 1980. In November 2003, President da Silva arrived in Havana and brought with him commitments for some US$200 million in Brazilian private sector investments in Cuba, and settled the Cuban government's US$40 million debt to Brazil by accepting payment in kind (e.g., Cuban vaccines). In addition, since Lula's election in 2002 Brasilia's BNDES export development bank has announced over US$100 million in government financing for joint ventures with Cuba. Lula has also championed Cuba's anti-FTAA position and, as head of Latin America's largest economy, could single-handedly turn an FTAA accord without Brazil into a Pyrrhic victory for U.S. policymakers. Alongside Argentina, Brazil has invited Cuba into MERCOSUR as part of Lula's goal, and Castro's strategy, of establishing a Latin American alternative to the FTAA.(14)

COLOMBIA: Since their founding in the early 1960s, both of Colombia's Marxist guerrillas, the ELN and the FARC, have maintained direct or indirect ties to the Cuban regime. Of the two, the ELN, which was established to "defend the Cuban Revolution" and replicate it in Colombia, continues to be the closest to Cuba in terms of ideological orientation and explicit support for the Castro regime. The Cuban government is more careful in maintaining public distance from the FARC in order to avoid being tainted by the guerrilla's blatant involvement in the international drug trade. However, both the ELN and the FARC regularly use Cuba as a safe haven. For example, over the years senior ELN and FARC commanders have clandestinely gone to Havana for medical treatment. Politically, both the ELN and the FARC are under the umbrella of the Sao Paulo Forum and have thus been acknowledged by the Castro regime as the radical left's legitimate representatives in Colombia. A new electoral front has been established, however, with the rise of former communist activist and labor leader Luis Eduardo "Lucho" Garzon to the mayoralty of Bogota. After winning what is considered to be the second most important political office in Colombia in October 2003, Garzon went to Havana in December to meet with Fidel Castro. According to press sources, Garzon's unexpected visit to Cuba generated enough concern at the CIA for the U.S. government to express its concern to the Colombian embassy in Washington. Garzon has claimed that his role model is Brazil's "Lula" da Silva, not Castro. Given the longstanding bond between Castro and da Silva, such a statement must be heartening to Havana.(15)

ECUADOR: Despite parallels with Venezuela's Chavez, the colonel turned populist president of Ecuador, Lucio Gutierrez, has proven to be lukewarm and timid in distancing himself from Washington and fulfilling a pledge to overturn the "neo-liberal" economic order in his nation. In November 2002, Fidel Castro made an official visit to Ecuador during which he met with the interim president, Gustavo Noboa, and with president-elect Gutierrez. However, Castro, accompanied by Hugo Chavez, also went out of his way to speak to the real power behind the throne, Ecuador's Confederation of Indigenous Nations (CONAIE) and its political arm, the Pachakutik Party.(16) In 2003, Fidel Castro received Gutierrez's vice president, Dr. Alfredo Palacio, who signed a series of cooperation accords (including one for medical treatment of Ecuadorian citizens in Cuba) with the Cuban government while Havana showcased its prized biotechnology facilities and healthcare system to the Ecuadorian physician turned statesman.(17) Meanwhile, China, Cuba's new global strategic partner since the disintegration of the USSR, welcomed Gutierrez into the communist fold during an August 2003 state visit to Beijing that resulted in a US$100 million investment by a Chinese firm in an Ecuadorian oilfield.(18) Nonetheless, it now appears that the radical left's patience with Gutierrez has been exhausted. In a communique dated 22 December 2003, CONAIE/Pachakutik condemned Gutierrez as a traitor(19) and called on constituents to mobilize for a series of mass protests that "will shock the country."(20) Leonidas Iza, CONAIE's head, has also stated that there will be no further dialogue with the administration in Quito and that the opposition will "insist on [Gutierrez's] resignation."(21) The political climate in Ecuador is likely to reach a boiling point imminently after an attempt on the life of Leonidas Iza and his family by unknown gunmen on Sunday, February 1, which left Iza unscathed but his son hospitalized in critical condition. Iza had just returned to Quito from the anti-FTAA conference in Havana.(22) CONAIE/Pachakutik has publicly accused President Lucio Gutierrez and his government of responsibility for the attempted assassination of Iza, reiterated its demand for Gutierrez to step down, and is forming vigilante committees across the country to protect its leadership.(23) If Gutierrez should be overthrown by a CONAIE-led populist movement, it is likely that Ecuador will solidify relations with Cuba, become a refuge for the FARC and ELN guerrillas from Colombia, and align itself, as Gutierrez has failed to do, with the emerging anti-U.S., anti-FTAA bloc in South America. For Cuba, securing an ally in oil-rich Ecuador could help offset the loss Venezuela if, in a worst case scenario for Havana, Chavez should be removed from the presidency in Caracas following a referendum on his rule in 2004.

EL SALVADOR: Following national legislative and municipal victories, including the mayorship of the capital city, San Salvador, in 2003, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) will contend with the ruling, pro-U.S. ARENA party for the presidency in El Salvador in March 2004.(24) The FMLN is the political heir to the Marxist guerrillas supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union against the U.S.-backed Salvadoran government in the 1980s. The FMLN is a member party of the Sao Paulo Forum and its candidate for the 2004 presidential election, 73-year-old Jorge Schafik Handal (a.k.a. "Comandante Marcelo"), is an unrepentant revolutionary (former head of El Salvador's communist party and commander of Marxist forces during the country's civil war) and friend of Castro's Cuba. At the fifth Sao Paulo Forum conference in 1995, Handal proclaimed, "Cuba is the hope...There will be Cuban socialism and revolution forever."(25) If he wins the presidential election, Handal has pledged to re-establish El Salvador's diplomatic relations with communist allies, including Cuba and China.(26) Strategically, a Handal administration would likely reverse El Salvador's current commitment to a U.S.-Central America free trade accord. Such a policy would in turn further diminish prospects for implementation of the hemisphere-wide FTAA by January 2005, as sought by Washington.

URUGUAY: At present, the administration of President Jorge Batlle of Uruguay stands as the only obstacle to Cuba's entry as an "associate member" in the Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay trading bloc in South America better known as MERCOSUR.(27) With Batlle's term coming to an end in 2004, Uruguay's Frente Amplio (FA) leftist party is poised for a major victory in the upcoming presidential election in October. Tabare Vazquez, FA's presidential candidate, has already committed himself to restoring full diplomatic ties with Havana -- severed by Batlle in 2002 -- and lifting the current Uruguayan administration's opposition to Cuba's membership in MERCOSUR. In addition, Vazquez and the FA approved a resolution rejecting Uruguay's own entry in the FTAA.(28) Uruguay's FA movement is a founding party of the Sao Paulo Forum and, should Tabare Vazquez take charge of the presidency in Montevideo, Cuba will undoubtedly be welcomed into MERCOSUR immediately. Furthermore, membership in MERCOSUR will, to an extent, shelter Cuba from the economic ramifications of exclusion from the FTAA. It would also effectively put an end to Havana's political ostracism from regional multilateral organizations since 1962, year in which the Castro regime was expelled from the Organization of American States (OAS).(29)

VENEZUELA: Venezuela under Hugo Chavez is the linchpin of Cuba's foreign policy objectives in Latin America. With Chavez facing a referendum on his rule in 2004, the Castro regime is investing heavily in bolstering support for Chavez's presidency among core constituents. Cuba has established a permanent presence in Venezuela with more than 10,000 physicians and health professionals serving in poor urban and rural areas as well as hundreds of teachers, literacy instructors, and sports trainers dispersed throughout the country, all in an effort to solidify Chavez's political base.(30) Were Chavez and his administration to fall democratically, the Cuban government would face an immediate economic crisis due to the loss of the Venezuelan oil it gets from Caracas on financial terms highly favorable to Havana.(31) The urgency of recent consultations at the highest level, with Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez meeting twice in less than one month,(32) bespeaks the commitment and concern of the Cuban regime that Chavez remain in power at all costs.

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NOTES

1. Fidel Castro, as quoted by the BBC in Havana. Cf. BBC Mundo, "Castro: morire combatiendo," 30 January 2004.

2. Cf. Official Cuba-sponsored website of the anti-FTAA movement, [ www.alcaabajo.cu ].

3. Fidel Castro, as quoted by the official Cuban press. Cf. Maria Julia Mayoral and Joaquin Rivery, "Habra muchas alternativas para un mundo mejor," Havana, Granma, 30 January 2004.

4. Mayoral and Rivery, "Habra muchas alternativas...," Note 3 above. See also Patricia Grogg, "ALCA No, CAFTA menos," Havana, IPS, 30 January 2004.

5. Roger Noriega, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, as quoted by The Associated Press. Cf. "State Department: Chavez, Castro won't derail FTAA plans," AP, Miami Beach, 30 January 2004.

6. Cf. Reuters, "Argentina, Cuba restore full ties, discuss debt," Havana, 13 October 2003; "Cuba pagara la deuda con medicamentos," Buenos Aires, La Nacion, 14 October 2003. On Cuba's entry into MERCOSUR, see Anthony Boadle, "Argentina wants Cuba to join Latam bloc vs U.S.," Reuters, Havana, 3 Nov. 2003.

7. Cf. Adam Saytanides, "Bolivia Offers Cautionary Tale for FTAA Negotiations," In These Times, November 16, 2003.

8. Cf. "The Sao Paulo Forum: Castro's Shocktroops," Executive Intelligence Review, November 10, 1995.

9. Cf. "Evo Morales in Havana: Latin America could be another Viet Nam for the USA," Havana, Granma Internacional, November 5, 2003.

10. Evo Morales, speaking at a Sao Paulo Forum conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina in August 1995, as quoted in the Executive Intelligence Review. Cf. "The Sao Paulo Forum: Castro's Shocktroops," Note 8 above.

11. Evo Morales, speaking before the Mexican congress in October 2003, as quoted by A. Saytanides, Note 7 above.

12. Cf. Alexia Guilera Madariaga, "Entrevista a Felipe Quispe," La Paz, Bolivia, Agencia Prensa Rural, 22 October 2003.

13. Cf. Reuters, "Bolivia loses out in natural gas project," La Paz, Bolivia, 22 December 2003.

14. Cf. Mireya Castaneda, "Lula's Visit to Havana: Cuba-Brazil Cooperation Diversifies," Havana, Granma Internacional, 29 September 2003; Patricia Grogg, "Brasil-Cuba: Buenos negocios hacen buenos amigos," Havana, IPS, 27 September 2003. On Brazilian government financing for trade and joint ventures with Cuba, see Reuters, "Prestamo brasileno de 60 millones de dolares para telecomunicaciones en Cuba," Havana, Granma Internacional, 7 Nov. 2003, and news releases by BNDES [ http://www.bndes.gov.br ]. It is no secret that Fidel Castro and Lula da Silva first met in Nicaragua in 1980 and have maintained the closest of ties ever since. Cf. Xinhua News Agency (China), "Nuevos aires impulsan relaciones Cuba-America Latina," Havana, 3 February 2004 [ http://www.spanish.xinhuanet.com/htm/12170937152.htm ].

15. Cf. "ELN: Fidel Castro's Personal Project," and "FARC: Colombia's Third Cartel," in Executive Intelligence Review, November 10, 1995. Both the ELN and the FARC are official member organizations of the Sao Paulo Forum. Cf. "Leftists Open Havana Meeting," The Orlando Sentinel, December 5, 2001, [http://www.canfnet.org/News/archived/011205newsa.htm]. On Cuban aid to the FARC and ELN, see U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, April 2003 [ http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19991.htm ]. On the visit of Bogota's new mayor to Havana in December 2003, cf. The Associated Press, "Alcalde de Bogota se reunio con Fidel Castro," Bogota, Colombia, 11 January 2004.

16. On Fidel Castro's courting of radical indigenous groups in Ecuador during his visit in November 2002, see AIN [Cuban state-run news agency], "Sostiene Fidel encuentro con indigenas ecuatorianos," [ http://www.ain.cubaweb.cu/fidelviajes/ecuador/ecuadorprincipal.htm ].

17. Cf. Miguel A. Untoria Pedroso, "Firman importantes acuerdos entre Cuba y Ecuador," Havana, Granma Internacional, 1 August 2003.

18. Cf. "Chinese, Ecuadorian Presidents Hold Talks," Beijing, People's Daily, 27 August 2003; Xu Yihe, "China's Sinochem Buys Ecuador Oil Block For $100M," Singapore, Dow Jones, December 15, 2003.

19. Cf. Pachakutik's official website, [ http://www.pachakutik.org.ec ].

20. Leonidas Iza, as quoted by The Associated Press. Cf. "Mas ataques de indigenas contra Gutierrez," AP, Quito, Ecuador, 17 January 2004.

21. Leonidas Iza, as quoted by The Associated Press. Cf. "Amenazan con protestas indigenas ecuatorianos," AP, Quito, Ecuador, 6 January 2004.

22. Cf. "Atentan contra Presidente de la CONAIE y sus familiares," Granma, 3 February 2004.

23. See communiques posted on the official CONAIE/Pachakutik website as of 3 February 2004, [ http://www.pachakutik.org.ec ].

24. Cf. Margaret Swedish, "El Salvador: FMLN the favorite in March election," RTFCAM, Central America/Mexico Report, July/August 2003, [ http://www.rtfcam.org/report/report.htm ].

25. Schafik Handal, in a speech to a Sao Paulo Forum gathering in Montevideo, Uruguay, in May 1995, as quoted in "The Sao Paulo Forum: Castro's Shocktroops," Note 8 above.

26. Cf. The Associated Press, "El Salvador: FMLN promete politica exterior abierta," San Salvador, 14 January 2004.

27. Cf. "Uruguay vetoes Cuba's entry to Mercosur," Montevideo (Uruguay), Mercopress, 3 November 2003.

28. Cf. Agence France-Presse, "Izquierda uruguaya dice si a Cuba y no al ALCA," Montevideo, December 21, 2003.

29. Cf. Organization of American States (OAS) official website, under "Member States," [http://www.oas.org].

30. Cf. The Associated Press, "Chavez thanks Castro for doctors," Caracas, 15 December 2003.

31. See Alexei Barrionuevo and Jose de Cordoba, "For Aging Castro, Chavez Emerges as a Vital Crutch," The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2004.

32. Cf. Reuters, "Castro y Chavez refuerzan su alianza en una reunion privada," Caracas, 23 December 2003; "Fidel y Chavez examinan en La Habana acuerdo de cooperacion," Havana, Granma Internacional, 15 January 2004.

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*Second in a two-part series. See Part I, Issue 51, January 22, 2004

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