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THE SHOOT DOWN OF BROTHERS TO THE RESCUE
AIRCRAFT / February 24, 1996
NetforCuba
(Español debajo)
Three U.S. citizens and a resident of Florida
were assassinated on February 24, 1996 when two
civilian Brothers to the Rescue aircraft, on a
humanitarian mission, were ambushed in
international airspace by Cuban MiGs. The shoot
down was ordered by Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.
This premeditated crime remains unpunished and
unresolved by U.S. authorities, who are obliged
and duty bound to act, under "THE RULE OF LAW",
since U.S. citizens and American airplanes were
the target of an act of international terrorism
perpetrated by Castro’s Cuba.
Fidel Castro and his accomplices in Cuba and the
U.S. have not been criminally indicted.
After careful review of the available
information and data, obtained by Brothers to
the Rescue from expert independent sources and
the U.S. government itself, we have enough
evidence to prove that the Clinton-Gore
Administration:
1. Had prior knowledge of the attack,
2. Consented to the shoot down,
3. Collaborated with Castro’s Cuba to make the
crime possible,
4. Covered up its own participation, by using
misinformation and efforts to remove evidence
and potential witnesses, and
5. Refused to indict and obstructed the criminal
indictment of Fidel Castro and others
responsible for the crime.
A third aircraft on the mission, piloted by José
J. Basulto, miraculously escaped the shootdown,
with three other witnesses onboard. Here we
present the above mentioned evidence and our
testimony.
____________________________________________
DERRIBAMIENTO DE LAS AVIONETAS DE HERMANOS AL
RESCATE
24 de febrero de 1996
Tres ciudadanos americanos y un residente del
Estado de la Florida, fueron asesinados el 24 de
febrero de 1996, cuando dos avionetas civiles de
Hermanos al Rescate, en una mision humanitaria,
fueron atacadas en espacio internacional por
MiGs cubanos. El derribamiento fue ordenado por
el dictador cubano Fidel Castro.
Este crimen premeditado, aun permanece impune y
sin resolver por parte de las autoridades
norteamericanas, quienes estan obligadas a
actuar, bajo sus propias leyes, debido a que
dichas avionetas conjuntamente con ciudadanos
americanos a bordo, se convirtieron en foco de
un brutal acto terrorista, perpetrado por la
Cuba de Castro.
Fidel Castro y los autores materiales del
asesinato, no han sido aun procesados
criminalmente por las autoridades de Estados
Unidos.
Después de haber revisado cuidadosamente la
informacion y data disponible, obtenida por
Hermanos al Rescate de fuentes expertas
independientes del gobierno de Estados Unidos,
se tiene suficiente evidencia para probar que la
Administracion Clinton-Gore:
1. Tenia previo conocimiento de el ataque,
2. Consintio el derribamiento
3. Colaboro con la Cuba de Castro para hacer
posible el crimen,
4. Cubrio su propia participacion a traves de la
desinformacion y esfuerzos para remover todo
tipo de evidencias y testigos potenciales, y
5. Reuso a encausar y obstruyo el encausamiento
criminal de Fidel Castro y demas responsables
por este crimen.
Una tercera avioneta en esta mision, piloteada
por José J. Basulto, milagrosamente escapo del
derribamiento, con tres otros testigos a bordo.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE FEB. 24,
1996 SHOT DOWN OF BROTHERS TO THE RESCUE
AIRCRAFT. (English only)
BTTR's first encounter with Cuban MiGs triggers
a response from U.S. Air Force interceptors and
a protocol for BTTR flights (followed on Feb.
24, 1996) intended for its operational safety.
The procedures to be followed include: 1) The
filing of a flight plan which is provided in
advance to the Cubans; 2) a unique transponder
code to clearly identify each BTTR aircraft; 3)
radio communication with Cuba's air traffic
controllers prior to crossing parallel 24 south.
This procedure is still followed and this
information is still routinely given to the
Cuban authorities by the FAA before every BTTR
search and rescue mission.
References:
U.S. Coast Guard report of first encounter.
Witness on incident and protocol, Mary Ann
Zduncyzk, former supervisor for the FAA flight
service in Miami, spoke with the Miami Herald.
See Tropic Magazine, Feb. 16,1997, pg. 13.
12/19/92
BTTR is warned via radio by the FAA of impending
danger and requested to land. BTTR was later
advised that MiGs were in its search area.
Witnesses available on request.
1995
The U.S. military takes a "un-official" but
important role in secret talks with Cuban
Military officials, at Guantanamo, Cuba. A video
tape of the "friendly" talks at the Guantanamo
Naval Base is leaked to the press and reported
in Miami
BTTR organize and participate in several
seminars on the subject of nonviolence as a tool
for change in Cuba, with the Albert Einstein
Institution, The Florida Martin Luther King Jr.
Institute for nonviolence and with Ricardo
Antocich S.J. a Roman Catholic priest and a
scholar on the subject.
These activities were made public.
The Miami Times Feb. 8,1996 pg. 4A, "Spreading
King's Message"
07/13/95
BTTR participates in a flotilla, to remember and
honor the 41 men, women and children killed on
that date the previous year, after the sinking,
by the Cuban Navy, of the "13 de Marzo" tug
boat. BTTR aircraft flies over Havana to divert
the attention of the Cuban command plane away
from the boats of the flotilla, when these were
being rammed by Cuba's gunboats. The command
plane followed one of the BTTR aircraft.
The Miami Herald July 15, 1995 article "Thirteen
Minutes Over Havana"
Later in 1995
BTTR makes a commitment to provide relief
supplies to the refugee camp in the Bahamas on a
weekly basis, typically on Saturdays, and
regularly did so. Several organizations
including the Red Cross and The Salvation Army
participate. Witnesses available.
01/09/96 & 01/13/96
Operation "Martin Luther King Jr.". BTTR drops
leaflets containing the U.N. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights over Havana, from
international air space, taking advantage of
meteorological conditions and altitude.
Reference:
BTTR press release Jan. 19, 1996 and Miami
Herald Jan. 15,1996 "A Political Deluge"
01/??/96
U.S. Intelligence detects Cuban MiGs practicing
air to air missile firing against slow moving
aircraft similar to BTTR's. Time Magazine
article dated Oct. 28, 1996 page 46. "Clinton's
Cuban Road to Florida"
02/12/96
Retired Admiral Eugene Carroll of the Center for
Defense Information, reported to the State
Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency
that during his visit to Cuba the Cuban
authorities had asked him and others in his
group how the U. S. government would react if
Cuba shot down exile planes that violated Cuban
air space. Carroll informed the U.S. that he
took the question as an indication that Cuban
military officials were considering such an
action.
See CNN transcript of news show 9:25 am ET Feb.
25,1996
2/13/96
BTTR pledges its support to "Concilio Cubano"
and publicly provides an undisclosed donation of
funds. Despite acting in accordance with "open"
U.S. policy to Cuba, BTTR is not granted a
license to assist Concilio Cubano, and is
privately criticized by U.S. authorities for
acting on its own.
See Miami Herald Feb. 14,1996 pg. 2B "Brothers
gives ....
" and El Nuevo Herald, Feb. 4,1996 pg. 3A
"Nuccio defiende ..."
02/17/96
The U.S. State Department advises various
governmental agencies that BTTR may be planning
a political statement on 02/24/96, thus creating
a dangerous perception of BTTR's intentions.
This information was fabricated and probably
initiated at the F.B.I. by Cuba's double agent
and occasional BTTR pilot Juan Pablo Roque, who
later returned to Cuba on 2/23/96 (one day
before the shoot down).
See Testimony of Customs radar expert Jeffrey
Houlihan at the court hearing of the FAA vs.
Jose Basulto. (Mr. Houlihan was a witness for
the U.S. Government, not Mr.Basulto.)
Court transcript pg. 361, 362, 364. and Sun
Sentinel Feb. 29,1996 "'FBI admits ... "
2/18/96
MiGs practice the shoot-down of a slow flying
small aircraft, according to testimony from
participant obtained in Tampa.
Miami Herald article dated Aug.7, 1997.
02/??/96
Jeane Kirkpatrik, Reagan's former U.N.
Ambassador, informed The Miami Herald that a
Clinton administration official, knowledgeable
about Cuban affairs, had spoken with her, about
his own concern and loss of sleep over his
conviction that something dreadful was going to
happen to the Brothers planes and volunteers.
See The Miami Herald's Tropic magazine Feb., 16,
1997 pg. 11.
02/23/96
Richard Nuccio, White House expert on Cuban
affairs, told Chris Marquis, of the Miami Herald
Washington Bureau, that Brothers to the Rescue
were headed for a clash with Cuban authorities
the next day.
Tropic Magazine Feb., 16, 1997 pg. 12.
The International Civil Aviation Organization
("ICAO") report states that the State Department
believed the Cubans to be in a "rough mood" that
week. ( ICAO report pg. 50 paragraph 2.2.2). It
is interesting to note that given all of this
information the U.S. State Department did not
warn BTTR.
11:00 am
BTTR made its weekly plan to fly to the Bahamas
and invited various non-BTTR members to
participate as observers.
4:00 pm
The Bahamian government notifies BTTR that it is
denied entry into the refugee camp due to a
visiting delegation from Cuba. As a result, BTTR
plans a standard search and rescue mission in
the Florida Straits, responding to the news of
new departures from the Island as it had done in
1800+ missions 'in the past.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED ON FEBRUARY
24,1996
12:15 to
12:40 P.M
Cuban MiGs are sighted in the area north of
Havana by U.S. radar. (See ICAO Report pg. 51,
paragraph 2.3.1.2) BTTR later learned from Maj.
Houlihan and others that U.S. interceptors
responded to their presence.
1:15 P.M.
Three BTTR aircraft depart for regular
humanitarian search and rescue mission. Four
U.S. radar facilities activate surveillance of
BTTR aircraft. (See ICAO report pg. 51,
paragraph 2.3.3.1.1)
Approx.
2:50 P.M.
BTTR planes see a U. S. military intelligence,
Orion type aircraft, headed East, at the same
altitude, approximately five miles north of the
24 parallel. An unusual sighting.
2:57 P.M.
BTTR contacts Havana Center to report their
crossing of the 24th Parallel Southbound, as
done on all search and rescue missions since
07/21/91. (ICAO report transcript pg. 22 through
32.)
3:00 P.M.
Two Cuban MiGs take off to intercept the BTTR
aircraft. (U.S. Air Force screen-print marked
"1")
Shortly thereafter, U.S. interceptor jets at
Homestead Air Force Base were placed on
"battlestations" alert. The Homestead F-15s were
then directed off of battlestations by Cheyenne
Mountain. This has been characterized as due to
a "communications error".
3:10 P.M.
Cuban MiGs fly above BTTR aircraft (U.S. Air
Force screen-print marked "2")
3:15 P.M.
Major Jeffrey Houlihan of the U.S. Customs Radar
Surveillance out of March Air Force Base in
California identifies the Cuban MiGs flying
towards the United States and maneuvering around
the BTTR aircraft. He proceeds to make the
equivalent of a "911" call to the Southeast Air
Defense Sector at Tyndall Air Force Base.
Tyndall Air Force Base confirms Major Houlihan's
sighting and states, "we're handling it, don't
worry".
The Miami Herald, "U.S. Radar Official: 911
call", dated July 3, 1996.
Major Houlihan further testified that there is a
standard operating procedure in which
interceptor jets must be deployed once Cuban
MiGs cross the Cuban 12 mile territorial limit,
yet this procedure was not followed in this
case.
Houlihan court testimony pg. 482.
Miami Air Traffic Control Center could also have
been contacted in a matter of seconds to warn
the BTTR aircraft as has been done in the past
or BTTR's Opalocka base control could have been
contacted directly in under 2 minutes, as has
also been done in the past.
The Miami Herald article dated July 3, 1996
Houlihan's testimony during the FAA vs. Basulto
court hearing, pg.430.
3:21 P.M.
MiG shoots down first BTTR aircraft, after
visually confirming and describing target
identity (as a blue and white Cessna 3 3 7) to
Cuban military controllers. This occurred 6 to 7
minutes after Major Houlihan's "911" call to
SEADS.
Transcript of MiGs communications Exhibit G-1,
pg. 4.
3:28 P.M.
MiG shoots down second BTTR aircraft after
visually confirming and describing the target
identity to Cuban military controllers. This
occurred 6 to 7 minutes: after the first BTTR
aircraft had been shot down and 14 minutes after
Major Houlihan's "911 " call.
MiGs transcript of communications, Exhibit G-1
pg. 5.
It is alarming that no attempt was made to warn
the BTTR aircraft. On numerous occasions in the
past, the BTTR aircraft had been contacted,
while in flight. concerning Cuban MiGs 'in the
vicinity or requesting other information. On all
occasions, when advised of Cuban MiGs, BTTR has
returned to their base.
Witnesses on request.
3:35 P.M.
First pair of Cuban MiGs return to Cuban bases.
3:35 P.M.
Second pair of MiGs pursue third and last
remaining BTTR aircraft on a Northbound course,
guided by military ground radar control.
3:41 P.M.
Remaining BTTR aircraft crosses 24th parallel,
Northbound.
U.S. radar data.
3:45 P.M.
MiGs make visual contact with the remaining BTTR
aircraft and communicate with ground control for
instruction. They are 'instructed to continue
pursuit.
MiG's communications transcript, ICAO Report,
Exhibit G-2 pg. 10, 11 and 12.
3:47 P.M.
MiGs positively identifies, to Cuban
controllers, the third remaining BTTR aircraft
as a light blue Cessna 337. MiGs maneuver about
and around the third BTTR aircraft losing
contact two times.
ICAO Report, Exhibit G-2 pg. 10, 11 and 12.
3:49 P.M.
BTTR aircraft at 24:16': 18", placing it at
about 16 miles North of the 24th parallel
U.S. Air Force screen prints.
3:53 P.M.
The third BTTR aircraft is at 24 - 26' NORTH and
082 - 27' WEST. About 26 miles North above the
24th Parallel in U. S. controlled airspace. The
Cuban Migs, after regaining visual contact of
the BTTR aircraft for the third time, are told
to suspend its mission by ground control,
because it was too high. Meaning too far to the
North?. At this point. the Cuban MiG was three
minutes from U.S. shores.
See MiG's Communications transcript Exhibit G-2
pg. 13 for event time, and U.S. radar data from
radar site B94, for location.
3:14 P.M. to 3:53 P.M.
During a total of 39 minutes, while the Cuban
MiGs pursued the BTTR aircraft, the United
States made no attempt to contact the BTTR
aircraft, as had been done on numerous occasions
in the past. A call would have taken less than a
minute. The U.S. Air Force did not authorize two
F-15 interceptor jets to take off when they were
already in battle stations with engines running
to deter the Cuban MiGs' attack.
Miami Herald's Tropic Feb. 16, 1997 pg.14.
For video, please go to:
http://www.netforcuba.org/HumanRights-EN/Videos/CrimesVideos.htm
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Apoyemos todos unidos a la Asamblea para
Promover la Sociedad Civil en Cuba la cual
tendrá lugar el próximo 20 de mayo de 2005 en la
Habana, Cuba. Desde cualquier rincón del mundo
hagamos patente nuestra solidaridad y ayúdenos a
divulgar su Sitio en Internet:
www.asambleasociedadcivilcuba.info
¡HAGAMOS HISTORIA, CUBANOS!
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